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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to contribute to the systematic explanation of journalists’ 
professional role orientations. Focusing on three aspects of journalistic 
interventionism – the importance of setting the political agenda, influencing public 
opinion and advocating for social change – multilevel analyses found substantive 
variation in interventionism at the individual level of the journalist, the level of the 
media organizations, and the societal level. Based on interviews with 2100 journalists 
from 21 countries, findings affirm theories regarding a hierarchy of influences in 
news work. We found journalists to be more willing to intervene in society when 
they work in public media organizations and in countries with restricted political 
freedom. An important conclusion of our analysis is that journalists’ professional role 
orientations are also rooted within perceptions of cultural and social values. 
Journalists were more likely to embrace an interventionist role when they were more 
strongly motivated by the value types of power, achievement and tradition. 
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The study of journalists’ professional orientations and worldviews has long been at 
the forefront of scholarly inquiry into journalism. One particular feature of journalists’ 
understanding of their role is interventionism – that is, the extent to which journalists pursue a 
particular mission and promote certain values in their work (Hanitzsch 2007). Journalistic 
interventionism is particularly relevant to the study of news as it boils down to the essence of 
journalism’s relationship with society and socio-cultural processes. It is for this reason that 
interventionist media roles have been traced in many surveys of news workers, with 
journalists acting as “participants,” “advocates,” and “missionaries” (Cohen 1963; Donsbach 
and Patterson 2004; Janowitz 1975; Köcher 1986). During the past two decades, the focus in 
this strand of research has shifted strongly to cross-cultural comparison (see for an overview 
Hanitzsch and Donsbach 2012; Örnebring 2013). 
At the same time, the question of what shapes the news has kept journalism and mass 
communication researchers busy for several decades. It is often argued that journalists’ 
professional role orientations strongly depend on political and economic contexts (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004; McChesney 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Weaver 1998) as well as on 
journalists’ individual characteristics and political views (Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab 
1991; Köcher 1986; Donsbach and Patterson 2004). However, relatively little attention is paid 
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to the organizational dimension and the way it relates and compares to the individual and 
societal levels (Weaver and Löffelholz 2008). 
A survey of the considerable wealth of literature about journalists’ professional role 
orientations allows us to identify a number of important shortcomings: First, there is a lack of 
comprehensive accounts, as most studies consider a rather limited number of factors, a 
specific sample of journalists and news media, or particular national contexts. Second, there is 
a need for more explanatory studies (Donsbach and Patterson 2004). Despite the notable 
progress made after comparative research gained currency in the 1990s, our knowledge about 
the forces that underlie differences in professional orientations is still somewhat limited. 
Third, more attention needs to be paid to cultural factors. Recent studies point to an 
interaction between socio-cultural values and journalistic role orientations (Hanusch 2009; 
Kim and Kelly 2008; Weaver 1998). Yet, the relationship between professional orientations 
and cultural values is not fully understood. Fourth, the multilevel structure behind the various 
influences on journalism has rarely been addressed at the level of research design. There is a 
need for studies that assess determinants of journalism culture across the societal, 
organizational and individual levels of analysis (Hanitzsch et al. 2010; Preston 2009; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Whitney, Sumpter, and McQuail 2004). Fifth, and finally, the 
methodological consequences of such a multilevel structure have not been fully explored. 
Journalists are mostly nested within news organizations, and news organizations are nested 
within countries. Traditional statistical techniques, such as ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, downplay potential interdependence among journalists from the same news 
organization or the same country and can produce misleading results when an inherent 
multilevel structure is ignored (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Southwell 2005). 
This article seeks to close the above gaps. We aim at identifying the primary forces 
that account for differences in professional role orientations, more specifically, in the extent to 
which journalists embrace interventionist values in their work. We address multiple influences 
on journalistic interventionism across the societal, organizational and individual levels of 
analysis and take into account the methodological consequences of such a multilevel structure. 
Furthermore, we pay close attention to cultural values in the nexus of potential determinants 
of professional role orientations. The overarching research question that motivated this 
analysis is as follows: What are the major determinants of interventionist values among 
journalists, and, to what extent do cultural values play out in this process? The data for this 
analysis were taken from the cross-national Worlds of Journalisms Study, an unprecedented 




Journalistic interventionism and role orientations 
 
By role orientations we refer to particular sets of ideas by which journalists, 
consciously and subconsciously, legitimate their role in society and render their work 
meaningful (Hanitzsch 2007). These values, attitudes and beliefs are essentially perceptions, 
or subjective understandings, for they are bound to journalists’ cognitive faculties. Role 
orientations encompass generalized and aggregate expectations which journalists believe are 
deemed desirable in society (Donsbach 2012), and they incorporate the occupational values 
and beliefs individual journalists embrace as a result of their professional socialization and the 
internalization of normative expectations. Role orientations should be distinguished from role 
enactment, which is the process by which role orientations translate into action (Tandoc, 
Hellmueller, and Vos 2012), and role performance, which captures the roles of journalists as 
they are executed in practice (Mellado and van Dalen 2013). 
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Our conceptualization of journalistic interventionism draws on a long tradition of 
research on journalistic role orientations. Interventionism reflects the extent to which 
journalists pursue a particular mission and promote certain values in their work (Hanitzsch 
2007), and it is sometimes also discussed with reference to journalists’ active involvement in 
social processes (Himelboim and Limor 2005). Interventionism in our understanding 
combines and further develops a set of role conceptions that have been theorized for more 
than half a century. Cohen (1963, 19‐20) identified a “participant” role that he associated with 
journalists’ active participation in the policy‐making process. According to Janowitz (1975, 
619), some journalists act as “advocates” for those who are “denied powerful spokesmen” 
and, in so doing, “point out the consequences of the contemporary power imbalance.” Based 
on a comparative analysis, Köcher (1986, 63) found German journalists saw themselves as 
“missionaries,” as spokespeople for the underdog, as those who take up grievances – ideas 
that stand for value judgments and advocacy. A sophisticated theoretical attempt was 
undertaken by Donsbach and Patterson (2004, 265) who distinguish between a passive and an 
active approach on the one hand, and a neutral vs. an advocate approach on the other. Most 
relevant for our purpose are the active approach, associated with journalists “actively shaping, 
interpreting, or investigating political subjects,” and the advocate position, in which 
journalists take sides and do so “in a consistent, substantial, and aggressive way.” 
The above role conceptions, however, have the tendency to aggregate aspects of 
journalists’ roles that do not necessarily refer to the same thing and which may not always be 
compatible. Like Donsbach and Patterson, we believe that journalistic advocacy needs to be 
disentangled from the idea of watchdog journalism that stands in the tradition of the news 
media acting as Fourth Estate and guardian of democracy (Gans 1979; Schramm 1964). 
Watchdog journalism is not per se connected to advocacy and participation. Journalists can, 
and often do, point to social grievances and political misconduct from a reasonably neutral 
and objective perspective. 
Interventionism, as we understand it, refers to role models such as the “participant,” 
“advocate,” and “missionary” (Cohen 1963; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Janowitz 1975; 
Köcher 1986). In this view, journalists take a more active, socially committed and assertive 
role in their reporting, and in so doing they involve themselves in social and political 
processes to the extent that they become participants. These journalists may act on behalf of 
the socially disadvantaged, as mouthpiece of a political party, or give voice to a specific 
ideological position. As a consequence, journalistic interventionism can be articulated in 
various distinct ways, depending on the organizational and national contextual settings. The 
impetus behind interventionist journalism is not to stay apart from the flow of events, but to 
participate, intervene, get involved, and promote change. An interventionist impulse of this 
kind can be found in normative concepts such as peace journalism and even more so in 
development(al) journalism, as well as civic or public journalism (Gunaratne 2006). 
Consequently, we are able to identify three theoretically relevant facets of 
journalistic interventionism that may play out in different ways in different societies. 
Journalists in interventionist professional cultures are more likely to actively put issues on the 
political agenda (agenda-setting), to influence the way the public thinks about these issues 
(public influence), and to advocate for certain values and ideas to transform society 
(advocacy). 
Cross-national comparisons have found journalistic interventionism to be a principal 
component of variation in journalists’ professional orientations (Hanitzsch et al. 2010, 2012). 
Interventionism, it seems, is generally not a characteristic of western journalistic cultures. A 
tendency towards interventionist values was found among journalists from developing 
societies and transitional democracies, where it can partly be placed in the context of 
“development journalism” (Wong 2004, 26). Strong interventionism was also found in Egypt 
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and, partly so, in Turkey. An interventionist orientation does generally seem to be a 
distinctive feature of journalism in the Arab world (Pintak 2011). 
 
Determinants of interventionism 
 
There is much reason to believe that the determinants of journalists’ professional 
orientations, and interventionism for that matter, stem from the societal, organizational and 
individual levels simultaneously (Hanitzsch et al. 2010; Preston 2009; Whitney, Sumpter, and 
McQuail 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Voakes 1997). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) 
have proposed a hierarchical structure of influences on journalism that are arranged in the 
form of five nested levels. The individual level is in the center and refers to the characteristics 
and backgrounds of the journalists, their personal attitudes, values and beliefs, as well as their 
professional orientations. The next higher levels are, in this order, the media routines 
(journalistic practices), the organization (organizational goals, roles, structures and control), 
the extra-media level (information sources, revenue sources, social institutions, economic 
environment and technology) and the ideological level (system-level influences). 
Our conceptualization of the determinants of journalists’ interventionism recognizes 
three basic levels of analysis in the sociology of work: societies (countries), organizations 
(newsrooms) and individuals (journalists). With regards to the societal level of media systems 
it is often argued that the political context is a major source of cross-national variation in 
journalistic cultures (Gurevitch and Blumler 2004; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Weaver 1998). 
Since journalistic autonomy is generally restricted by the social power structure, one could 
reasonably argue that journalists’ interventionism is higher in societies that grant them with 
more political freedom. However, empirical evidence suggests otherwise (Hanitzsch et al. 
2010, 2011). It may actually be restricted political freedom that motivates journalists to be 
more interventionist: either because they are forced to act as missionaries for the dominant 
ideology, or because they intellectually oppose the system with the intention to improve 
society. Political parallelism is another important factor; it refers to the degree and nature of 
the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which media 
systems reflect the major political divisions in society (Hallin and Mancini 2004). High levels 
of interventionism among journalists should be present in contexts with strong traditions of 
political parallelism, such as Southern Europe and Latin America (Hallin and Mancini 2004; 
Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). Our first set of hypotheses therefore is as follows: 
Journalists are more likely to embrace an interventionist role in societies  
- that are politically less free (H1) 
- with stronger political parallelism (H2) 
Furthermore, journalists mostly operate within highly organized contexts, most 
notably the newsroom and media organization (Fishman 1980; Gans 2003; Golding and 
Murdock 1991). Especially ownership has long been established as a major, if not the most 
important factor that shapes news production at the organizational level (Donohue, Olien, and 
Tichenor 1985; Weaver et al. 2007; Sigelman 1973; Zhu et al. 1997). Most relevant in this 
respect is the distinction between three general types of ownership: private, public and state 
ownership. In state-owned media organizations, governments tend to have a stronger grip on 
the editorial management than in privately owned media. We therefore expect journalists 
working for these news organizations to be less interventionist. This means that there are 
different explanations at work at the societal and organizational level: While journalists may 
be more interventionist when they work in a country with restricted political freedom, they 
might be less inclined to entertain interventionist values in state-owned newsrooms with 
restricted autonomy because taking a passive approach in reporting can be a safe way to avoid 
political repercussions and potential punishment by the employer. Similarly, their colleagues 
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in public media organizations may be less interventionist because they mostly subscribe to an 
institutional framework that requires them to be neutral and objective in their effort to 
represent all cultural and political ideologies in their societies. This brings us to our third 
hypothesis: 
Journalists are less likely to embrace an interventionist role in state-owned and 
public media organizations than in privately owned news media (H3). 
Influences on the individual level originate from journalists’ personal and 
professional backgrounds and worldviews, as well as from their specific roles and 
occupational characteristics within the news organization. These factors matter because 
“journalists, unlike most other professions, constantly have to make perceptional decisions” 
(Donsbach 2004, 151). One of the most important factors in this context is the editorial 
autonomy journalists enjoy within the newsroom, which is widely accepted to be one of the 
most fundamental requirements for professional journalistic practice (e.g., Gans 2003; 
McDevitt 2006; Soloski 1989). We conceptualize professional autonomy primarily in terms of 
the “latitude that a practitioner has in carrying out his or her occupational duties” (Weaver et 
al. 2007, 70). Here, we expect journalists to be more interventionist if given more editorial 
leeway to do so. 
Professional experience is another factor that we think is important in this context, 
but there is fairly little that we know about its influence. We tend to believe that professional 
experience correlates negatively with interventionism. More experienced journalists may be 
less likely to subscribe to an interventionist framework after they were socialized into the 
predominant norm of objective and neutral journalism. Furthermore, they might be less 
motivated to challenge the social and cultural norms as they have much more to lose, as they 
tend to have higher salaries and be more highly ranked in the editorial and social hierarchies. 
The third factor at the individual level is political interest. Extending the now classic 
gatekeeping research of White (1950) and Flegel and Chaffee (1971), several studies have 
pointed to a relationship between journalists’ political views and their reporting (Donsbach 
and Patterson 2004; Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab 1991). Effects, however, were of mostly 
small or moderate size. On this ground we hypothesize that political interest is positively 
associated with journalistic interventionism. Our third set of hypotheses reads as follows: 
Journalists are more likely to embrace an interventionist role  
- when they enjoy greater editorial autonomy (H4) 
- when they are less experienced (H5) 
- when they are politically more interested (H6) 
Finally, we think there is reason to believe that cultural values impact on journalists’ 
professional orientations, too. Journalists do not operate in a cultural vacuum but are 
influenced by the belief systems that prevail in their respective societies. In cross-cultural 
psychology, individuals’ values, attitudes and beliefs are referred to as “deeply rooted, 
abstract motivations that guide, justify and explain attitudes, norms, opinions and actions” 
(Schwartz 2007, 169). As such, we reason that journalists’ cultural and social values also 
inform their professional views and practice. 
The cross-cultural psychologist Shalom Schwartz (1994, 92) argues that values on 
the individual level “reflect the psychological dynamics of conflict and compatibility that 
individuals experience in the course of pursuing their different values in everyday life.” Value 
dimensions, along with the goals that represent them, can be grouped into a circular structure 
of ten motivational types of values (Schwartz 2004).2 Of these, three value types are of 
particular importance to journalists’ role orientations: 
- “Power” is indicated by striving for social status and prestige, as well as control 
or dominance over people and resources. 
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- “Achievement” refers to an orientation toward personal success through 
demonstrating competence. 
- “Tradition” denotes respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and 
ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self. 
Since the relationship between professional and cultural values is largely uncharted 
territory in the field of journalism research, there is fairly little we can draw on to specify 
assumptions. Journalism is a highly competitive business, which is why we expect 
interventionist journalists to be motivated by the values of power and achievement. This 
expectation is in line with Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss (1999), who make a case for a 
distinctive domain of prestige values in the work place. Through interventionist reporting, 
journalists can achieve visibility and recognition among their peers and in the larger public, 
and they can improve their social status and prestige. The values of tradition, on the other 
hand, should be rather detrimental to journalistic interventionism, as interventionism would 
most likely mean to change the status quo (i.e., tradition). This brings us to our final set of 
hypotheses: 
Journalists are more likely to embrace an interventionist role  
- when they are more strongly motivated by power values (H7) 
- when they are more strongly motivated by achievement values (H8) 




Selection of Countries, Samples and Data Collection 
 
The analysis reported in this article is based on 2100 interviews with working 
journalists in 21 countries. The surveyed countries include Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda and the United States. The 
selection of countries followed the configurative logic of a “most different systems design” 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970) and therefore encompassed a broad range of national contexts. 
The selection of countries essentially followed a maximizing-variance strategy by which we 
tried to take account of the global diversity in terms of political systems, socio-economic 
development, media systems and development, as well as social and cultural value systems. 
Within the 21 countries, sampling was carried out in two steps. We first selected 20 
news organizations in each country following a common target sample (see Table 1). The 
choice of newsrooms was organized along two parameters: On the first level we distinguished 
between types of media, as well as between national and local/regional media. On a secondary 
level we stratified print media into quality (citizen-oriented) and popular (consumer-oriented) 
outlets,3 and electronic media according to ownership into public, state-owned or private 
channels. While the choice of popular print media was based on circulation, the quality outlets 
were selected according to their perceived agenda-setting power.4 Online newsrooms were 
omitted from the study, as the degree of their institutionalization still varied considerably 
across countries. All national research teams invested a great deal of effort in order to match 
the overall sampling scheme and, at the same time, achieve a reasonable approximation to the 
diversity that exists within their countries. 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Wherever possible, we selected five journalists in each newsroom. Since the total 
sample size in every country was 100 respondents, this study does not claim to portray a 
representative picture of news people in the 21 nations. Rather, the various country samples 
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were “matched” in terms of their internal composition to allow for meaningful cross-country 
comparison. To this end, Hofstede (2001), for instance, suggests minimal sample sizes of at 
least 20, preferably 50, respondents per country. 
To capture the various domains of news work we selected respondents from the 
traditional “hard news” beats, as well as from other editorial areas. Within news 
organizations, journalists were further stratified according to the extent of their editorial 
responsibility. Ideally, one journalist was selected from the top echelon of the editorial 
hierarchy (e.g. chief editors and their deputies), one from the middle level of operational 
decision-makers (e.g. senior editors and desk heads), and three from the lowest level of the 
newsroom hierarchy (e.g. reporters). The selection of journalists in each of these categories 
was based on random sampling. 
The research tools used in this study were collaboratively designed in order to 
guarantee a maximum degree of intercultural validity. A fully standardized master 
questionnaire was first developed in English and then translated into the relevant languages. A 
relatively simple wording was used in order to reduce potential translation problems. 
Translation usually involved an iterative translation-backtranslation procedure or committees 
of bilingual experts to achieve the best possible approximation to the original master 
questionnaire. 
The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2011 by telephone and personal 
interviewing.5 The enthusiasm of journalists and newsroom managers varied from case to case 
and country to country, sometimes substantially. From all 414 newsrooms that were originally 
chosen, 28 refused to cooperate and were subsequently replaced. On the level of journalists, 




Interventionism was measured through three indicators. In the interview, the question 
was introduced as: “The following list describes some of the things the news media do or try 
to do. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how important each of these things is in your work.” 
The scale was later reversed in order to make interpretations more intuitive, resulting in higher 
values to indicate higher importance. The three indicators were worded as follows: “To set the 
political agenda,” “To influence public opinion” and “To advocate for social change.” 
Information about political freedom was obtained from the Freedom in the World 
database, published annually by Freedom House. The ratings process for freedom is based on 
a checklist of ten political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. Each pair of 
political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” 
“Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered 
“Free,” 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free.” In our analysis we treated political 
freedom as a dummy variable, with a value of one representing a politically free country, and 
a value of zero indicating partly free and not free societies.6 Political parallelism was modeled 
after Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the extent to which media systems reflect the major 
political divisions in society. A more detailed explanation was provided on a score sheet on 
which all principal investigators categorized political parallelism levels in their respective 
countries as either “high”, “medium” or “low”. For the purpose of this analysis, we collapsed 
the “medium” and “low” categories into a single group. Data on media ownership was 
gathered through document analysis (e.g. annual business reports), searches in public 
databases and telephone inquiry. On the basis of ownership information, we divided the 
investigated newsrooms into three broad groups: state-owned, public and private. Private 
ownership was used as the base category in our regression models. 
Editorial freedom was measured in the questionnaire through a five-point rating 
scale, which asked respondents to express their agreement to the statement: “I have a lot of 
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control over the work that I do.” Interest in politics was assessed by inviting interviewees to 
indicate their political interest on a five-point scale ranging from “extremely interested” to 
“not interested at all.” In addition, we asked respondents to indicate the number of years they 
had been working in journalism (professional experience). Finally, cultural values were 
measured on a five-point scale ranging from “extremely important” to “not important at all.” 
The statements we used for the purpose of this analysis were worded as follows: “To be in 
charge” (power), “To be successful and get recognition” (achievement) and “To follow 
religious or family traditions” (tradition). In addition, we included gender and education as 
controls in our analysis, as these factors have been found to be influential in several studies 




All hypotheses were tested by using multilevel modeling as analytical technique. A 
major advantage of this method over OLS regression is that analysts can model variance at 
multiple levels simultaneously, and they can allow intercepts and regression slopes to vary 
between groups (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Hox 2002; Park, Eveland, and Cudeck 2008). 
Since there was only little variation in the regression slopes for individual-level predictors, we 
built random-intercept models for all dependent variables in which regression coefficients 
were fixed. The intercepts, however, were allowed to vary, which means that the model takes 
into account that journalists’ interventionism can be different across organizations and 
countries. As a first step, we estimated empty or “null” models that did not carry any 
predictor. The null models provided useful information about the variance components for the 
three levels of influence (see Tables 2-4). In a second step, we built random-intercept models 
that included all predictors. All models were estimated based on standardized data; hence, the 
resulting coefficients can be interpreted as standardized betas. 
The empty models indicated that variance components for the organizational and 
societal levels were all significant at p<.001. Based on the information provided for the 
variance components, we calculated Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) that denominate 
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is “accounted for” by each higher 
level. Results indicate that cross-national differences contribute 8.2, 27.8 and 20.7 percent to 
the overall variance in journalists’ interventionism (for “setting the political agenda,” 
“influencing public opinion” and “advocating for social change,” respectively). The 
organizational level, on the other hand, accounts for 8.2, 5.8 and 8.8 percent of the total 
variation.  
In order to test our hypotheses and identify the key factors that explain variation in 
journalists’ interventionism we estimated additional models with all predictors included. 
Hypothesis 1 was mostly supported (see Tables 2-4). Journalists are indeed more likely to 
embrace an interventionist role in societies that are politically less free. This was especially 
true with regards to the importance of influencing public opinion and advocating for social 
change. The results for setting the political agenda came close to significance (p=.08). 
Hypothesis 2 was not confirmed, as there was no relationship between interventionism and 
political parallelism. Hypothesis 3 was partly supported. Journalists are indeed less likely to 
influence public opinion in state-owned and public media organizations than in privately 
owned newsrooms,7 but we found no such relationship for setting the political agenda. 
Journalists in public media are more strongly inclined to advocate for social change. 
On the individual level, hypotheses 4 and 5 were not confirmed. There was no 
substantive association between interventionism and editorial autonomy or professional 
experience. The relationship between setting the political agenda and professional experience 
comes close to significance (p=.06). Hypothesis 6 received only limited support. Journalists 
are more likely to set the political agenda when they are politically more interested. We found 
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no such association for the other two indicators. Likewise, Hypothesis 7 was confirmed only 
for one aspect: Journalists are more likely to advocate for social change when they are more 
strongly motivated by power values. Hypothesis 8 was supported in two of the three models. 
Journalists are more likely to set the political agenda and influence public opinion when they 
are more strongly motivated by achievement values. This relationship does not hold, however, 
for advocating for social change. Hypothesis 9 was not confirmed, although coefficients 
turned out significant. The results actually contradicted our hypothesis consistently in all three 
models. Hence, journalists are more likely to embrace an interventionist role when they are 
more strongly motivated by tradition values. 
 




Methodologically, this analysis demonstrates one thing very clearly: The variation in 
journalists’ interventionism on the organizational and the societal level of analysis, indicated 
by the size of the Intraclass Correlation Coefficients and significant variance components, was 
substantive across all three models. This means that ignoring the multilevel structure of 
variance in journalistic interventionism would have led to a misspecification of the modeled 
relationships and, as a consequence, would most likely have produced misleading results. The 
first step in our analysis (the inspection of the empty models) led to the important conclusion 
that in this case – and most likely in many other cases, too – multilevel modeling should be 
favored over “flat” OLS regression. Regression models that ignore an existing nesting and 
interdependence between objects that belong to the same class or group violate three essential 
assumptions inherent in linear OLS regression: independence of observations, constant slopes 
and intercepts, and uncorrelated residuals. When all variation in the model is collapsed into a 
single error term, estimators for predictors at higher levels of analysis can have substantively 
deflated standard errors, producing dubious tests of significance (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; 
Southwell 2005). On the theoretical level, these results also attest to the usefulness of 
approaches that model influences on the news in terms of a hierarchy of forces acting on 
different levels (Hanitzsch et al. 2010; Preston 2009; Whitney, Sumpter, and McQuail 2004; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Voakes 1997). 
Furthermore, our results show that cross-national differences contribute more 
variation than the organizational level, which means that differences in journalists’ 
interventionism loom larger between countries than between news media organization. This 
was especially true for two aspects of interventionism: the importance of influencing public 
opinion and advocating for social change. Here, we found substantive cross-national variation, 
indicating that there are striking differences between journalists in different countries with 
respect to these features of professional role orientations. As expected, our evidence points to 
the importance of political context, with political freedom playing a major role. We found 
journalists in politically less free countries were more likely to embrace an interventionist role 
in society. In two of the three models – for “influencing public opinion” and “advocating for 
social change” – the regression coefficients were particularly strong for political freedom. 
Even though we could reasonably argue that journalists’ interventionism should be more 
pronounced in societies that grant them more freedom, our results support an alternative view, 
which has important theoretical implications for our understanding of the relationship 
between journalists’ role perceptions and political contexts. It appears that restricted political 
freedom may actually motivate journalists to be more, rather than less interventionist. Reasons 
might be the political structures that confine them to act as missionaries for the dominant 
ideology (or they feel compelled to do so), or because journalists intellectually oppose the 
system with the intention to improve society. Table 5, which documents the mean scores for 
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the individual countries, provides some evidence to support this interpretation. In some of the 
politically less free countries, journalists may be more interventionist because they 
intellectually engage in political discourse with the intention to change society (e.g., in Egypt 
and Uganda). In other, more authoritarian contexts, journalists might act on behalf of the 
government and dominant ideology to bring about change as partners of political authorities 
(e.g., in China and Pakistan).This again illustrates why interventionist journalism should not 
be equated with the idea of watchdog journalism. 
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
We found no evidence, however, for an effect of political parallelism on journalists’ 
levels of interventionism. Perhaps political parallelism acts on the organizational rather than 
the individual level, which again is an aspect relevant to future theorizing. In societies 
characterized by a high degree of parallelism, journalists may simply comply with editorial 
policy and the ideological stance of their news organization, rather than with the intention to 
change society and make a political intervention. 
On the organizational level, we found little support for the assumed relationship 
between interventionism and state ownership of media organizations. While in some countries 
(e.g., in China) the media serve as propaganda tool for the government, state ownership in 
itself does not seem to carry any visible and substantive influence. However, there is some 
support for the impact of public ownership on journalists’ interventionism. We found 
journalists were less likely to influence public opinion and advocate for social change in 
public media organizations. As we reasoned earlier, journalists in public media organizations 
may be less motivated to intervene in society, as in most countries they operate in an 
institutional environment that emphasizes objectivity and political neutrality. One important 
normative function of public service media is to represent all cultural and political ideologies 
in society and give them visibility in public conversation. 
On the individual level, we found no substantive association between interventionism 
on one hand, and editorial autonomy and professional experience on the other. Higher 
editorial autonomy might provide journalists with the opportunity to perform an 
interventionist role. However, the very fact of having the opportunity does not seem to 
necessarily drive journalists to embrace interventionist values more strongly. Likewise, there 
was little evidence for journalists to be less interventionist as they become more experienced. 
However, for “setting the political agenda,” at least, we found a small effect pointing into the 
hypothesized direction. In a similar vein, we found support for a relationship between 
journalists’ interventionism and political interest only for one investigated aspect: Journalists 
are indeed more likely to set the political agenda when they are politically more interested. 
This means that a greater interest in politics motivates journalists to influence the political 
agenda but does in itself not drive them to go beyond this intervention. 
Our review of potential associations between journalists’ role orientations and some 
of the cultural values they embrace, we believe, produced a range of interesting insights in this 
analysis. We did indeed find evidence for such a relationship with regards to the value types 
of power, achievement and tradition. Journalists found it more important to advocate for 
social change when they are more strongly motivated by power values. To hold power means 
to have the discursive resources to leave an imprint on public conversation and promote 
change in society. The results also show that power values are more directed to the ultimate 
goal (social change) than they are to the discursive mechanisms to achieve this goal (influence 
political agenda and public opinion). 
Likewise, achievement values constitute another important driving force behind 
journalists’ interventionist role orientations. And while power values are connected with the 
goal of changing society, achievement values target the political discursive realm: Journalists 
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are more likely to set the political agenda and influence public opinion when they are more 
strongly motivated by achievement values, that is, “to be successful and get recognition” 
(questionnaire wording). As we reasoned in the discussion of our conceptual framework, 
journalists can achieve visibility and recognition among their peers and in the larger public 
through interventionist reporting, which may ultimately equip them with more prestige and 
higher social status.  
Our investigation of tradition values and their relationship with interventionism, 
however, also produced a surprising result. The effects of tradition values turned out to be 
significant, but they contradicted our hypothesis consistently. While we expected tradition 
values to be detrimental to interventionism – as an intervention would most likely mean to 
change the status quo – we found journalists are instead more likely to embrace an 
interventionist role when they are more strongly motivated by tradition values. In Schwartz’ 
(2004) value theory, “tradition” indicates respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs 
and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self. Making a journalistic 
intervention in society can obviously mean both: to intellectually challenge existing political 
and socio-cultural conditions, as well as to actively promote the conservation of these 
circumstances. At any rate, an important conclusion of this analysis is that journalists’ 
professional role orientations are, beyond many other factors, also deeply rooted within 
perceptions of cultural and social values. 
The implications of these finding are obvious. Cultural values and their importance in 
the context of journalistic work have long been marginalized in research on journalists, 
perhaps mostly so because they are so difficult to trace. This analysis clearly suggests that 
cultural values matter in journalists’ mindsets. However, much more research needs to be 





This study is not without limitations. While we carefully distinguished journalists’ 
role orientations from related concepts, such as role enactment and role performance, there is 
still a great deal of conceptual ambiguity in academic and professional discourses. In the 
scholarly literature, we find journalistic role orientations as “press functions,” “media roles,” 
“role perceptions,” “role conceptions,” “news ideologies” and “journalistic paradigms” 
(Cohen 1963; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Janowitz 1975; Pan and Chan 2003). The 
conceptual ambiguity stems from the fact that researchers tend to confound the attitudinal and 
performative aspects of journalists’ professional roles, as well as confuse the normative and 
empirical dimensions. In other words, many do not make sufficiently clear if they discuss 
normative ideas (what journalists should do), subjective orientations (what journalists want to 
do), and perceived performance (what journalists think they do in practice). And even if we 
tried to make this distinction clear in the interviews, we cannot rule out the possibility that at 
least several respondents confused the various aspects of journalists’ professional roles.  
Ultimately, we think that this article should not be seen as the end of a journey but as 
a beginning. While the design of this cross-national study was aimed at enabling valid 
multidimensional comparative analyses of journalists, its matched-quota sample is not 
necessarily representative. Thus, the lack of potential for generalizability is an important 
limitation. Larger and more robust samples are needed to make stronger universal claims in 
the context of this analysis. Another weakness of this study is its limited country sample. With 
only 21 nations investigated we realize that the number of highest-level units (i.e. countries) is 
relatively small, which can pose problems for multilevel modeling, although effect sizes are 
not likely to be severely affected. A simulation study of Maas and Hox (2005) indicated that 
even with a sample of ten higher-level units, the estimates of the regression coefficients were 
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sufficiently accurate. However, small samples can lead to biased estimates of higher-level 
standard errors (Hox 2002; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998). In order to reduce at least some of the 
potentially negative consequences of a small country sample, we followed Snijders and 
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1 The data set used for this analysis can be downloaded from 
http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/docs/WJS_2007-2011_public.sav. 
2 Schwartz (2004, 175) organized the ten value types into a circular structure, representing 
what he calls a “motivational continuum.” Values which are close to each other in the circle 
are similar in their underlying motivations, while those situated further away from each other 
represent antagonism. 
3 The quality press (e.g. “serious” newspapers such as broadsheets and news magazines) 
usually addresses its audience primarily as citizens, while popular outlets (such as tabloids) 
target an audience of consumers. 
4 In every country, there exists a tacit consensus among journalists and media scholars 
regarding the media that are considered to substantially shape the national political agenda. 
Hence, we selected those quality outlets which are commonly believed to have the greatest 
impact in this regard. For popular print media we selected the outlets with the highest 
circulation numbers. The selection of radio and TV stations was based on the ratings of their 
newscasts. 
5 Turkey was the only case where journalists completed questionnaires on their own while a 
researcher was present. 
6 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology. The political 
freedom data was transformed to meet the conditions for regression analyses as the 
distribution of values extremely deviated from normal distribution. 
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Table 1: Target sample 
Type of medium Sublevel National Local Total 
Daily newspaper quality: citizen-oriented 2 (10) 3 (15) 5 (25) 
popular: consumer-
oriented 





quality: citizen-oriented 1 (5) – 1 (5) 
popular: consumer-
oriented 
1 (5) – 1 (5) 
News agency  1 (5) – 1 (5) 
Television state-owned/public 1 (5) 1 (5) 2 (10) 
private 3 (15) 1 (5) 4 (20) 
Radio state-owned/public 1 (5) 1 (5) 2 (10) 
private 1 (5) 1 (5) 2 (10) 
Total  12 (60) 8 (40) 20 (100) 
Numbers in parentheses represent the total sub sample of journalists in the respective media category 
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Table 2: Setting the political agenda, predictors (N=1966) 
  Empty model  Random-intercept 
model 
  b SE p  b SE p 
Societal level         
Political freedom      -.120 .063 .075 
Political parallelism      -.001 .062 .986 
Organizational level         
State-ownership      -.007 .031 .834 
Public ownership      -.009 .026 .736 
Individual level         
Editorial autonomy      .013 .023 .567 
Professional experience      -.046 .025 .063 
Political interest      .111 .024 .000 
Importance of tradition      .058 .025 .021 
Importance of achievement      .107 .025 .000 
Importance of power      .041 .028 .147 
Education      .024 .023 .297 
Gender (1=female)      .019 .023 .411 
Intercept (γ000)  .008 .067 .906  .006 .059 .914 
Random effects  Var. comp. p  Var. comp. p 
Societal level (u00)   .082 .000   .060 .000 
Organizational level (r0)   .080 .000   .079 .000 
Individual level (e)   .841    .811  
Variance explained: R21=5.3%; R22=9.0%; R23=24.0% 
Equation: [set agenda] = γ000 + γ001 [freedom] + γ002 [parallelism] + γ010 [state] + γ020 [public] + γ100 
[autonomy] + γ200 [experience] + γ300 [political interest] + γ400 [tradition] + γ500 [achievement] + γ600 
[power] + γ700 [education] + γ800 [gender] + r0 + u00 + e 
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Table 3: Influencing public opinion, predictors (N=1965) 
  Empty model  Random-intercept 
model 
  b SE p  b SE p 
Societal level         
Political freedom      -.359 .086 .001 
Political parallelism      .036 .084 .680 
Organizational level         
State-ownership      -.060 .028 .030 
Public ownership      -.058 .023 .012 
Individual level         
Editorial autonomy      -.017 .020 .419 
Professional experience      .029 .022 .187 
Political interest      .026 .021 .227 
Importance of tradition      .053 .022 .018 
Importance of achievement      .060 .022 .008 
Importance of power      .046 .026 .074 
Education      .012 .021 .578 
Gender (1=female)      -.013 .020 .507 
Intercept (γ000)  .004 .117 .972  .005 .081 .956 
Random effects  Var. comp. p  Var. comp. p 
Societal level (u00)   .277 .000   .129 .000 
Organizational level (r0)   .058 .000   .053 .000 
Individual level (e)   .663    .653  
Variance explained: R21=16.3%; R22=33.1%; R23=51.8% 
Equation: [influence] = γ000 + γ001 [freedom] + γ002 [parallelism] + γ010 [state] + γ020 [public] + γ100 
[autonomy] + γ200 [experience] + γ300 [political interest] + γ400 [tradition] + γ500 [achievement] + γ600 





Table 4: Advocating for social change, predictors (N=1951) 
  Empty model  Random-intercept 
model 
  b SE p  b SE p 
Societal level         
Political freedom      -.283 .072 .001 
Political parallelism      -.090 .071 .223 
Organizational level         
State-ownership      -.012 .030 .694 
Public ownership      -.095 .025 .000 
Individual level         
Editorial autonomy      .029 .021 .180 
Professional experience      -.007 .023 .773 
Political interest      .025 .022 .265 
Importance of tradition      .069 .023 .004 
Importance of achievement      .036 .023 .118 
Importance of power      .064 .026 .015 
Education      -.003 .021 .905 
Gender (1=female)      .045 .021 .031 
Intercept (γ000)  .007 .102 .944  .007 .068 .914 
Random effects  Var. comp. p  Var. comp. p 
Societal level (u00)   .206 .000   .086 .000 
Organizational level (r0)   .086 .000   .074 .000 
Individual level (e)   .702    .693  
Variance explained: R21=14.3%; R22=31.2%; R23=55.8% 
Equation: [advocate] = γ000 + γ001 [freedom] + γ002 [parallelism] + γ010 [state] + γ020 [public] + γ100 
[autonomy] + γ200 [experience] + γ300 [political interest] + γ400 [tradition] + γ500 [achievement] + γ600 




Table 5: Country differences in interventionism (mean, SD, N=2046) 




Advocating for  
social change 
Australia 1.75(1.19) 1.83(1.13) 1.98(1.17) 
Austria 1.63 (.97) 1.33(1.05) 1.97(1.17) 
Brazil 1.65(1.10) 1.59(1.26) 2.49(1.19) 
Bulgaria 1.72(1.00) 2.72 (.99) 1.91(1.13) 
Chile 2.30(1.20) 2.93(1.10) 2.25(1.06) 
China 2.21(1.06) 2.87 (.80) 2.71 (.97) 
Egypt 2.18(1.32) 3.60 (.75) 3.50 (.78) 
Germany 1.80 (.94) 1.61(1.02) 1.59(1.12) 
Greece 1.66(1.10) 1.58(1.17) 2.40(1.10) 
Indonesia 2.33(1.11) 2.57(1.10) 2.83(1.02) 
Israel 2.05(1.20) 2.27(1.14) 2.31(1.32) 
Mexico 2.20(1.04) 2.55(1.12) 2.89(1.12) 
Pakistan 1.86(1.15) 2.82 (.93) 3.24 (.94) 
Portugal 1.69(1.02) 1.33(1.12) 1.63(1.21) 
Romania 1.91(1.05) 1.44(1.16) 2.43(1.09) 
Russia 2.24(1.08) 2.62 (.98) 2.03(1.04) 
Spain 1.28(1.15) 1.77(1.23) 2.16(1.21) 
Switzerland 1.83 (.94) 1.43(1.13) 1.80(1.15) 
Turkey 2.38(1.20) 2.84(1.07) 3.09(1.03) 
Uganda 2.46(1.14) 2.82(1.03) 3.25 (.91) 
USA 1.07(1.17) 1.41(1.21) 1.50(1.23) 
Total 1.91(1.16) 2.18(1.27) 2.38(1.24) 
Scale: 4=“extremely important” … 0=“not important at all” 
 
